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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to identify issues relevant to
real estate professionals considering the financing of
commercial real estate assets through the public or private
sale of mortgage backed securities. Currently, two
categories of securitized debt issues have emerged;
financings of individual, specified properties, and
financings of pools of mortgages, in which the underlying
mortgages may or may not be specified. This paper limits
its examination to property specific financings.
This paper describes the development of the mortgage backed
securities and the security markets. It also examines the
alternative issuing structures for property specific
securities, risk assesment methodologies, and the component
costs of capital raised. Two case studies are evaluated to
illustrate aspects of current security offerings. Finally,
this paper summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of
these transactions from the perspective of the borrower of
capital.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to identify issues relevant to
real estate professionals considering the financing of
commercial real estate assets through the public or private
sale of mortgage backed securities. Currently, two
categories of securitized debt issues have emerged;
financings of individual, specified properties, and
financings of pools of mortgages, in which the underlying
mortgages may or may not be specified. This paper limits
its examination to property specific commercial mortgage
securities (PSCMS's).
In response to continuing interest by investors in
commercial real estate, the prominent servicers of the
capital markets, the investment banks, have attempted to
create efficiently priced and liquid trading instruments.
By doing so, Wall Street hopes to overcome the illiquidity
of traditional forms of real estate ownership. Instruments
have incorporated debt, equity, participation in cash flow
or residual value, fixed or floating payments, or accrued
interests.
Wall Street has most recently shown interest in tapping into
the value of outstanding commercial real estate mortgages,
5
estimated to exceed $800 Billion. By securitizing this
debt, the investment banks hope to establish a capital
market as large as the corporate bond market. Assessing the
opportunities in this market, proponents have heralded the
success of its precursor, the residential mortgage backed
security market. With over $300 billion of these securities
issued, the residential market is firmly established and
growing.
Three principal instrument structures have been issued to
date in the commercial mortgage market; pass-through
structures, bond structures, and collateralized mortgage
obligations. Each is distinguished by its legal, accounting
and tax status. In addition, several internal structuring
devices such as prioritization of cash flows, coupon
stripping, and interest rate swaps, are available to modify
the income stream and risk distribution. Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduit's (REMIC's) also provide an
overlay structure which can generate similar permutations of
the security without altering the underlying debt.
Real estate investors must address several issues before
choosing PSCMS's as a funding vehicle. The size of the deal
is important, as many issuing cost are relatively fixed;
therefore economies of scale can be realized on larger
deals. The property must withstand highly conservative
scrutiny of all essential operating data in order to achieve
6
an investment grade rating. Several retrictions are placed
on the property and its cash flow in order to protect the
interest of investors. In return for these limitations, the
borrower is able to access much larger sums of capital than
through conventional sources, typically at competetive
interest rates.
organization and Methodology
Chapter II is a description of the development of the
residential mortgage securities market, the precursor and
model for the more recent commercial mortgage securities
market. The commercial mortgage securities market is
examined for its similarities to and distinctions from the
residential market. Chapter III describes the three capital
markets accessed through securitization, and the various
regulatory and practical limitations of each.
Chapter IV describes the alternative security structures
which have developed for packaging and trading mortgages;
pass-throughs, bonds and collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMO's). The principal characteristics of the Real Estate
Investment Mortgage Conduit (REMIC) legislation, passed as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, are identified.
Internal structuring devices, such as cash flow
prioritization, coupon stripping, and interest rate swaps
are also examined. Chapter V examines the risk evaluation
7
methodology utilized with property specific securities.
Chapter VI identifies and examines the component costs of
capital imposed by securitization, including direct and
indirect costs, deferred costs, and opportunity costs, while
Chapter VII describes and evaluates two case studies of
securitized financings.
Chapter VIII concludes the paper with a summary of issues
relevant to real estate professionals when considering
securitization as a financing alternative.
The methodology used in developing the paper included an
extensive literature search and a fieldwork component.
Numerous experts in real estate finance, securitization,
bond credit rating and credit enhancement were interviewed.
Summary of Conclusions
Securitized transactions are large scale transactions, which
use the global capital markets as their source of funds.
They typically raise in excess of $25 million, and are
capable of raising over $1 billion in single offerings.
This capacity far exceeds that of conventional lenders, such
as commercial banks, insurance companies, and pension funds,
which usually loan from $5 million to $200 million.
8
Scale economies play a significant role in the cost of funds
of securitized transactions. Although the underwriting and
structuring fees paid to the security issuer are usually a
percentage of the amount raised, many additional costs, such
as legal counsel, financial printing, advertising,
appraisals and administrative expense, are relatively
constant. As the size of an offering diminishes, these
fixed costs translate to an increasing percentage load on
the cost of funds to the borrower. There is a threshold at
which these costs eliminate the ability for securitized
issues to compete with the cost of funds available through
conventional sources.
In addition to direct costs, securitized offerings can
impose indirect costs on the borrower. Posting of liquid
asset reserve facilities, credit support, and the
reinvestment risk of property cash flows until payment of
semi-annual bond payments should be evaluated. Loan to
value ratios may be lower than those allowed by conventional
lenders, thereby forcing the borrower to invest additional
equity.
Borrowers seeking to raise between $25 million and $200
million must compare the effective cost of capital to the
cost of capital available through conventional lenders.
This comparison must include all costs, including direct and
indirect costs, deferred costs and opportunity costs.
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Limitations and Further Study
The first property specific commercial mortgage security was
issued by MSA Shopping Malls, Inc. in June of 19831. To
date less than 30 transactions are estimated to have
occured. Most of these securities have been sold in the
euromarket or through private placements, without the
requirement of public disclosure. Therefore access to
specific information regarding the costs of transactions is
limited. Of twelve organizations directly involved in
securitized transactions which were contacted for this
paper, only two were willing to disclose details of their
offering. Furthermore, euromarket and private placement
issues have limited trading activity after the initial
offering, thereby limiting the examination of the
characteristics of these instruments performance. Those who
choose to enter into these transactions will find the best
source of information to be the investment banking houses
which underwrite the securities.
With time, the ability to amass comprehensive data regarding
property specific commercial mortgage securities may
improve. One topic for further research in this area would
involve the determination of effective cost of capital to
the borrower by making a detailed comparison of actual
issuing costs of these securities with respect to their
10
rating classification and their yield when first issued.
This cost of capital could then be compared to the cost of
capital through conventional lenders in order to determine
if increased frequency of issuance of these securities
fosters pricing efficiency.
Another topic for study is the impact of the rating systems
on both the method of real estate appraisal and the
underwriting guidelines of conventional lenders.
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CHAPTER II. DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES
Development of Residential Mortgage Securities
The impetus for securitization of mortgages has its origins
in federal support of the residential sector, and developed
as a means of increasing capital flows to lenders in order
to ensure access to housing. In 1932 the Federal government
made its first concerted effort to support housing policy
with the formation of the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
This system offered financial support to thrift
institutions, the principal mortgage lenders of the era. In
exchange, the thrifts adopted Federal charters and adhered
to standards and regulations established by the Federal Home
1
Loan Bank Board
Further support of housing access was provided through the
formation of the Federal Housing Agency (FHA) in 1934. This
Agency offered insurance against mortgage defaults on any
loan conforming to FHA standards. In later years the
Veterans Administration (VA) began to offer guarantees to
2
eligible loans made by veterans . These programs
constituted the first forms of federal subsidy of mortgages;
it is these federal guarantees which have made the creation
of a secondary market for residential mortgages viable.
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As demand for mortgage credit grew, the need arose to
provide more capital. The federal government once again put
its resources to the task. In 1938 the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) was formed3 . Its
purpose was to purchase FHA insured and VA guaranteed
mortgages from thrifts, thereby providing further funds for
mortgage origination. This system proved adequate
throughout the relative economic stablity following World
War II.
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, inflation became a
serious problem. Simultaneously, the demand for mortgage
credit increased as city dwellers continued the exodus to
the suburbs. Inflation and increased demand combined to
cause housing costs to outstrip income growth. As loan to
income ratios increased, the creditworthiness of borrowers
declined. During this period, federal banking Regulation Q
imposed interest rate ceilings payable on individual
deposits, the traditional source of the thrift institutions'
funds. Depositors, in turn, withdrew funds in favor of
higher returns available through other capital market
instruments. Insurance companies, which had been purchasers
of whole loans from thrifts, were also experiencing capital
drains. Policy holders were increasing their demand for
loans at below market interest rates, which were available
by borrowing against the value of their policies.
14
In response, thrifts and life insurance companies channeled
capital into more interest rate sensitive investments, which
further reduced the funds for mortgage lending. The loss of
funding, known as disintermediation, in combination with the
increased demand for mortgage credit, placed significant
4
upward pressure on mortgage lending rates
In 1968, in an attempt to provide additional capital sources
to the thrifts, the Government National Mortgage Agency
(GNMA or Ginnie Mae), was formed. By using the "full faith
and credit of the United States", the agency intended to
provide capital support through purchases of FHA and VA
backed originations. In 1970 the incorporation of the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie
Mac) created an agency able to purchase, through its
borrowing rights with the Federal Reserve, qualifying
5mortgages that did not have FHA insurance or VA guarantees
The thrifts' access to funds was further enhanced with the
advent of mortgage bankers, who originated loans and sold
them wherever regional capital exceeded the demand for
credit. Their activities combined with increased uniformity
in the underwriting standards of the federal agencies to
facilitate interregional capital flows for mortgage
funding.6
In 1975, with the first GNMA pass-through, these agencies
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began issuing securities backed by mortgages purchases.
These securities were sold to investors, exchanged with
lenders for other mortgages, or used to facilitate further
borrowing by mortgage originators, thereby alleviating
shortages of mortgage funds. Over time, three basic forms
of mortgage securities have developed; pass-throughs, bonds
and pass-through derivatives such as collateralized mortgage
obligations. Each is distinguished by its legal, accounting
and tax status, and is described in greater detail in
Chapter IV.
In 1984 the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act
(SMMEA) was enacted, which was designed to expand the role
of private agencies issuing mortgage backed securities,
through the liberalization of credit restrictions and state
7blue sky reporting requiements . Currently, residential
mortgage backed securities of one form or another are issued
by investment banks, insurance companies, mortgage bankers,
saving and loans and commercial banks. By 1985 over $300
Billion of these securities had been issued
Development of Commercial Mortgage Securities
Wall Street has most recently shown interest in underwriting
the value of outstanding commercial real estate mortgages,
estimated in 1986 to approach $800 Billion. Exhibit 2.1
compares the value of these mortgages to other capital
16
markets. Exhibit 2.2 indicates the growth and distribution
by ownership of commercial debt, excluding multi-family,
during the period 1976 to 1986.
EXHIBIT 2.1: U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS, OUTSTANDING DEBT
(BILLIONS)
Commercial Mortgages $ 500
Multi-Family Mortgages
Federal Agencies, Mortgage Pools
Residential Mortgages
Corporate Debt Issues
Municipal / State Debt
U.S. Treasury Debt
TOTAL DEBT
200
100
$ 800
1,700
700
700
1,800
$5,700
Source: Roulac and Co., Federal Reserve Bulletin
EXHIBIT 2.2: COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING
1976 -1986 (BY INSTITUTION)
I~~ I I I
7e 77 78 79 80 t i
THR1FT INST1TUTIONS
=COMMERCIAL BANKS
82 83 84 5 se
UFE INSJRANCE COS.
OT-ERS
Federal Reserve Bulletin
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By securitizing commercial mortgage debt, the investment
banks hope to establish a capital market as large
corporate bond market. Although the social imperative
espoused for housing does not exist for commercial real
estate, the underwriters have found incentive in the
potential fees generated through securitization. For the
issuance of non-convertible corporate bonds, studies have
estimated underwriting fees, often refered to as spreads, to
10be approximately 1% of the principal amount of the bonds
By this measure, were the full value of outstanding
commercial mortgage debt to be securitized, the fees would
approach $8 Billion. Since their inception in 1983, the
annual volume of commercial mortgage backed securities
issuance has grown to over $5 billion in 1986. Yet trading
activity is very limited, due mainly to the newness of the
instruments and trading restrictions in the private
placement market and euromarkets where most of the
securities to date have been issued
Three principal markets exist for mortgage backed
securities; the public domestic market, the euromarket, and
the private placement market. The choice of market for
issuance of the security is determined by the size and
characteristics of the offering, risk profile of the
offering and differences in return expectations of investors
in each market. These markets and their restrictions are
discussed in further detail in Chapter III.
18
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CHAPTER III. SECURITIES MARKETS
The Public Domestic Market
Public domestic issues are offered for sale to investors at
large, both institutions and individuals1 . For mortgage
backed securities, the issuer is typically an entity
organized by the borrower for the sole purpose of issuing
the securities and serving as a conduit for the proceeds.
Public domestic issues are required to conform to the
Securities Act of 1933, which requires securities to be
offered and sold pursuant to a registration statement filed
with, and declared effective by, the Securities and Exchange
.2Commission . In the case of a debt offering, the statement
will identify the offering price, coupon rate, information
regarding the issuing entity and owner and a description of
the underlying collateral. The description includes
historical operating statements, property appraisals and
forecasted cash flows extending beyond the maturity date of
the securities. A statement of certain tax issues, the
legality of the securities and certifying testament of
financial auditors will also be included. The 1933 Act also
requires the issuer of the security to exercise due
diligence and imposes liability for any material defects in
the registration statement3 . After registration, the
offering statement is made available to the investors by the
underwriters in the form of a prospectus. In keeping with
20
the public accessibility of information, the securities are
traded on one of the large national exchanges, typically the
New York exchange, and prices are quoted daily based on
trading activity.
Public domestic issues are subject to other requlations as
well. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the
trading in securities and the activities of the brokers and
dealers. It establishes credit restricions of the issuer,
antifraud provisions and additional registration and
reporting requirements, including the repoting
material inside information
The Trust Indenture Act of 19
offered pursuant to an
requirements, and prohibits
part of indenture trustees.
1940 defines and regulates th
company engaged primarily in t
trading in securities, or wh
securities valued in excess of
mentioned in Chapter II, t
relating to the transaction.
39 mandates debt securities be
indenture meeting certain
conflict of interests on the
The Investment Company Act of
e activities of an investment
he investment, reinvestment or
ich owns or proposes to own
40% of its total assets. As
he Secondry Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 1984 was enacted to modify the Securities
Act of 1933, and liberalizes credit restrictions and certain
4
reporting requirements
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of any
The Euromarket
Euromarket offerings, in the form of eurobonds, are sold in
several international markets simultaneously. The offerings
are not subject to the jurisdiction of any single national
authority, although a few barriers to their issuance do
exist in some countries. Eurobonds for sale within the U.S.
must be registered with the SEC, a requirement the issuers
prefer to dispense with, for reasons of cost, simplicity and
privacy. Purchases by U.S. citizens can be accomplished
through offshore accounts. The limited disclosure
requirements of these offerings is one source of their
attraction for investors5 . Not only is income from
eurobonds exempt from taxation at the source of issue,
eurobonds are also sold in bearer form, allowing the holder
to remain anonymous. Although payment of tax is required to
the holder's country of residence, anonymity creates
opportunity for tax evasion. Some estimates place over half
of all eurobonds in the portfolios of individuals60
The growing acceptance of mortgage securities by the
euromarkets parallels the inflow of foreign capital into
U.S. real estate and other securities. Exhibit 3.1
illustrates the net foreign investment in U.S. securities
from 1976 to 1986. Rapidly increasing in 1985 and 1986,
most of this investment has been in the form of debt.
22
EXHIBIT 3.1: NET FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. SECURITIES
1976 TO 1986
r-
40
z
0
20
10
0
-10
z
I I I I I I I I I I I
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
FET STOCK PURCHSES NET WND PURCHAES
Federal Reserve Bulletin
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Source:
Anthony Downs has noted several reasons for this rapid
growth in investment activity:
* The U.S. has recently become a net importer of capital,
thereby flooding the world with U.S. dollars.
* The U.S. is perceived as economically and politically
secure.
* The value of the dollar has declined in relation to some
foreign currencies.
* The cost of capital in some foreign countries is low with
respect to the U.S.
* Some foreign countries have recently eased investment
restrictions on major institutions and investors, allowing
increased investment in U.S. real assets.
* Returns on investments in foreign markets have
historically been lower than those available in the U.S7 .
By investing in securities backed by U.S. real estate
mortgages, foreign investors perceive they have gained many
of the same benefits of direct investment, while retaining a
relatively high degree of liquidity. Furthermore, the
recent prices paid by some foreign investors for premier
U.S. real estate have often been far greater than those
offered by their domestic competition, resulting in below
8
market yield expectations for the purchaser . By
comparison, the yields on mortgage backed eurobonds seem
attractive.
24
Private Placements
Private placement offerings are made to a limited group of
investors. As defined by the Securities Act of 1933,
private placements may not involve public solicitations, and
must be limited to not more than 35 large and knowledgeable
investors. offerings which conform to these criteria are
exempt from the registration requirements of a public
offering. Each investor receives an offering statement,
sequentially numbered for identification purposes,
containing information substantively similar to a registered
statement. As with euromarket offerings, the limited
disclosure requirements restrict public access to specific
information about these offerings. This limits
opportunities for borrowers to objectively compare the
advantages and disadvantages of the available structures.
Private placements are somewhat simplified transactions due
to the limited number of investors. The ability of the
issuer to identify the specific investors prior to the
offering also provides the opportunity to carefully tailor
the offering to their specific risk exposure limitations and
return requirements.
25
offering size
Typically the minimum size of a private placement debt
offerings is $25 Million 10, but most transactions to date
have exceeded $100 Million. A public offering will
typically raise in excess of $100 Million. Most debt
offerings to date have been either private placements or
eurobond offerings, and have ranged from the $40 Million
Fisher Brothers Financial Realty First Mortgage Notes
offered April 1986, to the $970 Million Olympia & York
Maiden Lane Finance Corporation Floating Rate First Mortgage
Notes offered February/March 19841. Both of these issues
12
were offered on the eurobond market
The magnitude of the Olympia & York offering indicates the
capital potential of these markets. In fact, the principal
reason for choosing securitization given by owners
interviewed for this paper was the inability of U.S. banks
and insurance companies to handle the capital requirements
of their transaction.
The capital accessible through these markets would be more
than sufficient for the issuance of pools of commercial
mortgages through structures similar to the residential pool
offerings. Yet most offerings to date have involved from
one to three buildings. This may indicate that the recent
evolution of these transaction has been accompanied with
26
some caution on the parts of both borrowers and investors.
A more apparent reason is the current level of development
of the underwriting procedures for these transactions. Both
the public domestic markets and the eurobond markets look
for objective measures of the securities' safety. In
addition, certain institutional investors have fiducial
restrictions on the quality of issues they may hold. State
banking commissions publish a Legal Investment List of
permissable securities for investment by savings
institutions. The Employee Retirement Investment Savings
Act (ERISA) regulates investment by pension funds.
Insurance companies are subject to regulation of investment
activities by both state insurance commissions and the
National Association of Insurance Commissions. The commonly
accepted evaluation of the safety of a particular investment
is the rating given to the offering by one or more of the
rating agencies described in greater detail in Chapter V.
27
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CHAPTER IV. ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES
Property specific commercial mortgage securities are secured
by a mortgage on a single large property, or by mortgages on
a small group of properties. Their ability to make timely
payments of interest and principal are soley reliant upon
the property's cash flow. These securities lack the
diversification benefits inherent in the cash flows from a
pool of mortgages. The principal benefit of
diversification, either by location or property type, is
that systematic risk is more significant in determining
prepayment speed than is specific risk. Systematic risk is
due to economy wide perils, while specific risk is unique to
an individual property or its immediate environment. A
diversified mortgage pool minimizes the risk of an
individual property's effect on returns to the investor.
Property specific securities, particularly those based on
unseasoned properties, are therefore more subject to
prepayment through default risk than mortgage pools unless
some form of credit enhancement is provided, which may be
purchased from third parties or may be inherent in the
internal structure of the offering.
When consideration is given to the unique risk inherent in
property specific financings, the three basic residential
mortgage backed security structures ; pass-throughs, bonds,
and Commercial Mortgage Obligations (CMO's), are still
29
applicable when suitably adapted. Each of these structures
can be distinguished by its legal, accounting and tax
status, as discussed below.
Pass-throughs
A pass-through structure does as the name suggests; passing
through, on a monthly basis to the investor, a portion of
the cash flow yielded by the underlying mortgage or mortgage
pool. The structure may be in the form of pass through
certificates or participation certificates. Pass-through
certificates represent an undivided interest in a trust
owning a mortgage or mortgage pool. Participation
certificates represent an undivided ownership interest
directly in a mortgage or mortgage pool. A pass-through may
have any number of series of certificates, each backed by a
distinct mortgage or pool. The issuer of pass-throughs must
treat the issue as an asset sale for tax purposes.
Pass-throughs were the first type of security issued and
represent the largest segment of the residential securities
market. By 1985, over $280 Billion had been issuedA. Their
popularity is due in part to their relative predictability
of investment performance. The underlying mortgages are
largely uniform and have governmental credit support of
interest and principal payments. The main concern is the
effective maturity of the pass-through, a function of the
30
speed of prepayment of the mortgages.
Prepayment speed is negatively correlated with changes in
lending rates; as interest rates drop, the incentive to
refinance and the probability of prepayment increases. The
early prepayment of principal passes through to the
investor, who must then reinvest the funds at the prevailing
lower rates. This prepayment feature distinguishes
pass-throughs from U.S. treasuries, which have no
prepayment rights, and corporate bonds, which are limited by
specified call provisions. The reinvestment risk associated
with prepayment is compensated with higher yields as shown
in Exhibit 4.1.
EXHIBIT 4.1: BOND EQUIVALENT YIELD SPREADS FOR SELECTED
COMMERCIAL AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE PASS
THROUGH NEW ISSUES AND CORPORATE BONDS,
NONCALLABLE, 31 MAR 86-30 SEP 86
31 MAR 86 30 SEP 86
YIELD SPREAD YIELD SPREAD
-------------------------------------------------------
COMERCIAL PASS THROUGHS
AA Rated, Current Coupon 9.05% 170bp 9.43% 200bp
RESIDENTIAL PASS THROUGHS
GNMA 8% 8.88 129 9.07 176
GNMA 9% (New Current Pay) 9.18 159 9.38 202
CORPORATE BONDS (NON CALL)
AA Rated Domestic 7.86 51 8.04 61
A Rated Domestic 8.03 68 8.41 98
AA Rated Eurodollar 8.10 75 8.38 95
2
Source: Salomon Brothers Inc
The typical commercial mortgage differs from its residential
31
counterpart with respect to prepayment. Usually the
mortgage will have a lockout period, during which time the
borrower is prohibited from refinancing. Yield maintainance
requirements are also becoming prevalent. These provide for
premiums payable upon refinancing which sustain the yield as
though the mortgage ran the full term. Note the widening of
yields between commercial and residential pass-throughs as
shown in Table 4.1. This may reflect the increased
perception of overbuilding in office markets nationally, and
the commensurate increase in potential default.
Mortgage Backed Bonds
Mortgage backed bonds (MBB) were developed to appeal to
traditional fixed income investors, who were not comfortable
with the reinvestment risk and long maturities of
pass-throughs. Originally issued by banks and savings and
loans, bonds provided a low cost source of fixed term funds
without having to sell assets. The bond structure is
treated as debt of the issuer for accounting and tax
purposes. It may take the form of a general obligation of
the issuer, as in a fixed payment bond secured by a pool of
mortgages, in which the issuer is liable for timely interest
and principal payments. In this case the issuer assumes all
prepayment risk. Property specific bonds are usually
non-recourse obligations, backed only by the mortgage.
Additional credit enhancement or support may be provided if
32
the issue is rated.
The bonds are usually issued through a bancruptcy-proof
entity of the borrower. Mortgage payments are made to a
trustee which maintains seperate accounts for principal and
interest payments. The principal account is used to redeem
the bonds. The interest account is used to make bond coupon
payments, with any shortfalls satisfied by the principal
account and any credit support that is provided. This
reserve eliminates mismatched timing between mortgage and
bond payments; however it exposes the issuer to reinvestment
risk.
Bonds can be divided into several coupons of varying
maturity and yields. Fractioning the payment stream creates
options for investors who prefer the characteristics of
mortgage backed securities but desire shorter term
obligations.
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
In June,1983, FHLMC issued the first Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations (CMO). A CMO consists of mortgages or mortgage
securities repackaged into a multiple class instrument, and
has characteristics of both a bond and a pass-through. It
is treated as debt by the issuer for tax purposes. Each
class recieves a different priority claim against the cash
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flow. The highest priority class has the safest position
and recieves a return reflecting the low level of risk.
Conversely, the lowest priority class recieves a higher
return commensurate with its subordinate position.
Prioritization, often referred to as Fast Pay / Slow Pay,
provides more cash flow certainty and shorter maturities to
the fast pay class. It also provides a measure of call
protection to the slow pay class, as funds are only
available for redemption after the fast pay class is
satisfied. The use of an accrued interest class, recieving
payment only at maturity, can free up additional cash flow
to earlier classes, thereby reducing collateral
requirements. By tailoring CMO's to various investors yield
expectations and risk profiles, issuers earn profits on the
arbitrage between the bond yields and the cost of the
underlying mortgages.
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits offer a new
opportunity to create multiple class instruments from
underlying mortgages. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 created
the new form of intermediary mortgage ownership in order to
simplify some of the accounting and taxation problems of
mortgage backed security issuance. Impetus for the
legislation was fostered principally by Lewis Ranieri and
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Andrew Furer of Salomon Brothers and its final form contains
several key provisions:
* Elimination of double taxation. By electing REMIC status,
the chosen form of intermediary ownership of the mortgage,
(partnership, corporation, trust), is exempted from
federal taxation at the entity level. (Some states which
do not automatically follow federal law, notably
California, New York and Connecticut, are considering
taxation of REMICs issued in the corporate form. However,
no action had been taken by any state as of this
writing.3)
* Distinction of Ownership Forms. REMICs may have two forms
of ownership; Regular interests which have debt
characteristics, and Residual interests which have equity
characteristics. There may be any number regular interest
classes, but only one residual interest class. Both type
of interests are readily transferrable.
* Payment Allocations. REMIC interests may have payments
allocated in a disproportionate manner among various
classes of investors. Reallocation can occur by
subordinating one or more classes or by the creation of
fast pay and slow pay categories. Reallocation can be
utilized on both new and existing mortgages. This feature
allows the restructuring of benefits without altering the
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underlying mortgage documents and without explicit
borrower involvement. Subordinated instruments are
readily transferable, although they may be subject to
limitations imposed on certain regulated investors for
second mortgages.
* Taxation of Interests. Regular interest holders are
treated as if their interests were debt instruments.
Residual interest holders realize all net income of the
REMIC not attributed to regular interest holders.
* Taxation of Foreign Investors. REMICs eliminate the 30%
Foreign investor withholding tax on mortgages issued prior
to July 18,1984 .
* Effect on REITS. Both regular and residual interests are
treated as "real estate assets" for purposes of
qualification of an organization as a Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT).
* Permitted REMIC Assets. All of a REMIC's assets must be
qualified mortgages and permitted investments. Qualified
mortgages are principally secured, directly or indirectly,
by an interest in real property. Permitted investments
include three narrowly defined categories: cash flow
investments of a temporary nature producing passive income
in the form of interest; qualified reserve assets; and
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foreclosure property which may be held for one year.
Having greater flexibility than CMO's, industry observers
predict the REMIC structure will become the dominant form of
issuance of multiple class securities, particularly when the
issuer wishes to receive asset sale treatment of the
securities4 . Property specific financings issued by a sole
purpose entity which intends to treat security issuance as
debt can achieve most of the benefits of REMIC status
through the mortgage bond structure. Several internal
modifications are available which can fraction the income
stream, as well as the risk. These modifications, senior /
subordinated structuring, stripping, and interest rate swaps
are described below. It should be noted that , while the
REMIC structure can be overlayed without disturbing the
underlying mortgage, these internal modifications may
require developing the bond and mortgage indentures
simultaneously to ensure compatability and pricing
efficiency.
Senior / Subordinated Structure
The senior / subordinated structure can be used to create a
self credit enhancing instrument. For example, a security
can be composed of two classes; a senior class (class A)
which is rated and sold to the public or through a private
placement, and a subordinated class (class B) which is
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unrated and is either held by the issuer or sold through a
private placement. The B class are subordinated in their
right to receive payment of principal and interest. A
liquid asset reserve fund can be established and replenished
with proceeds from the sale of class B interests. The fund
is available to support cash flow disruptions to the class A
holders. Over time, as the underlying mortgage seasons and
risk of future losses diminish, the reserve fund balance can
be reduced. Eventually, class B holders can begin to
receive funds from the reserve as well as interest and
principal.
The senior class can be further divided into short,
intermediate, and long term rateable securities. The
fractioning of cash flows into several rated classes, each
supported by the subordinated class, enhances pricing
efficiency and trading liquidity of the instrument. The
sale of the subordinated class, with its concentration of
risk, requires a high coupon to offset the risk. In the
case of an unseasoned property, the subordinated interest
is, in effect, an equity option, as it represents a bet on
residual value without any certainty regarding interim cash
flows. Pricing may explicitly acknowledge this relationship
by providing participation in the residual on a percentage,
rather than a fixed, basis.
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Stripped Mortgage Structure
The conceptual premise of coupon stripping is to obtain a
greater value for the securities by redistributing the
income stream of the mortgage. The amount of principle
relative to interest allocated among the classes can vary
instead of being a constant, pro rata share. The allocation
may be made as principal only, interest only, or may vary
proportions of either or both.
By seperating and creating various combinations of principal
and interest, the instrument can be tailored to appeal to a
broader range of investors. Depending on the prepayment and
yield maintainance provisions of the underlying mortgage,
the newly created strips may have different prepayment
behavior than an unstripped instrument of equal coupon.
If a coupon is created below the coupon rate of the
underlying mortgage, it will retain the same likelyhood of
prepayment as the original mortgage. To offset the lower
coupon payments, the strip will sell at a discount to its
par value; hence these are termed Discount Strips.
Investors in Discount Strips expect that prepayment will
occur earlier than anticipated, as their profit lies in the
difference between par value and the discount amount paid.
Realizing this difference earlier increases the yield to the
investor.
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A Premium Strip has the opposite characteristics. It has a
coupon rate higher than the underlying mortgage and adopts
the prepayment characteristics of the lower rate. It
therefore sells at a premium to par. The extended time to
prepayment assures a longer term flow of coupon payments
than an unstripped security of the same coupon rate.
A Principal Only Strip is an extreme form of the Discount
Strip. As the name implies, no interim coupon payments are
recieved by the investor; the yield is soley dependent upon
prepayment of principal. The investor in premium strips
expects an earlier prepayment than the pricing of the strip
accounts for, thereby increasing the yield. Principal only
strips have limited applicability to property specific
commercial mortgage securities since prepayment rights are
restricted and therefore prepayment speed is more
predictble. The attractivenes of these instruments
therefore depend on the prpayment lockout period; if the
mortgage is prepayable for several years prior to bond
maturity, the investor may be able to realize increased
returns.
An Interest Only Strip separates the interest payment from
the principal. Without the benefit of any right to
principal, the interest only strip is susceptible to severe
losses should prepayment occur rapidly. These instruments'
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performance therefore tend to be highly positively
correlated with interest rate changes, counter to the
typical performance of fixed income instruments. Because of
this characteristic, Interest Only Strips are suitable for
use as hedging instruments.
When used for commercial mortgage securities, the prepayment
risk is significantly reduced to events of default and force
majeur as the prepayment rights are explicitely recorded in
the mortgage and offering statements. Furthermore, property
specific strips can be combined with the senior /
subordinated structure to create a synthetic amortization of
the underlying mortgage, thereby reducing default risk.
Consequently the remaining risk is principally attributable
to the subordination hierarchy of the classes.
Interest Rate Swaps
Property specific commercial mortgage securities can be
combined with interest rate swaps to create floating rate
yields with better prepayment protection than other
securities of comparable quality. The attractiveness of the
combination depends on the excess yield on the mortgage
backed security with respect to the fixed rate payable on
the swap. As a hedging technique interest rate swaps can
also provide a borrower with a method of converting a
floating rate obligation to a fixed payment stream. This
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technique can be useful when the prefered source of capital
is floating rate debt for its lower cost.
An interest rate swap is the exchange of interest rate
payments between two counterparties. The purpose is
threefold; to reduce interest rate risk by matching floating
rate assets to floating rate liabilities or fixed rate
assets to fixed rate liabilities; to exchange favorable
financing terms between the swap counterparties; and to
limit transaction costs and maintain confidentiality by
avoiding conventional refinancing.
In a typical swap an investor purchases a commercial
mortgage bond which has a borrowing rate based on Treasuries
of comparable maturity. The investor also enters a swap
agreement of the same duration as the bond. The investor
agrees to pay a fixed payment composed of the treasury yield
plus an additional spread to a counterparty. The combined
payment is less than the coupon on the mortgage bond. In
return the investor recieves a floating rate payment,
usually the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), while
retaining the differential between the mortgage coupon and
the fixed payment. The original fixed rate mortgage bond is
synthesized into a floating rate instrument. The swap
counterparty in turn converts a floating rate instrument
into a fixed payment stream. Exhibit 4.2 illustrates the
flow of funds in a basic swap transaction.
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EXHIBIT 4.2: INTEREST RATE SWAP
I interest based I
INVESTOR IN I----->1 on fixed rates I ----- >ISWAP
I I
MORTGAGE BONDI<-----I interest based I<-----ICOUNTERPARTY
A Ion floating ratel
linterest based|
Ion fixed ratesi
A
BOND ISSUER I<-----I interest based I<-----IMORTGAGOR
I on fixed rates I
Counterparties to a swap transaction do not exchange
liabilities. They only agree to make interest payments to
one another. Each counterparty is liable for the interest
and principal payments of their original obligation.
Although the liability appears on the originator's balance
sheet, the swap does not.
The swap technique depends on differences in borrowing
ability between the counterparties, known as quality
spreads. A quality spread is the premium a borrower with a
low credit rating has to pay over a borrower with a high
credit rating. These spreads differ for fixed rates and
floating rates and vary over time. It is important to note
that comparisons of these spreads are comparisons of debt of
different maturities. Floating rates, typically short and
intermediate term borrowing, have narrower quality spreads
than fixed rates, reflecting lenders' perception of reduced
exposure to default risk in shorter term loans.
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Interest rate swaps are suitable for longer term debt. Debt
with maturities of up to 2.5 years can utilize interest rate
futures contracts which typically have lower transaction
costs than swaps. These contracts are an agreement to buy
or sell a certain financial asset (Treasury bills, notes,
bonds; Bank and eurodollar CD's; Sterling CD's and Gilts;
GNMA's) for a specific price at a specific date in the
future. During the life of the contract, each time the
market value of the asset falls (interest rates rise), the
seller recieves cash. Should the reverse happen, the buyer
profits. The cash flow is handled through margins
maintained by both parties at the trading exchange.
Interest rate swaps have certain disadvantages. First,
there is the potential for disintermediation between the
underlying payments on either side of the transaction.
While the mortgage is based on Treasuries, the floating rate
payment recieved is often based on LIBOR, or some other
eurodollar denominated index. As illustrated in Exhibit
4.3, the spread between three month Treasuries and
eurodollars has been fairly constant between 1983 and 1987.
However, fluctuations such as that which occurred during the
fourth quarter of 1984 create interest rate exposure for the
holder of a swap. Transnational interest rate swaps are ,in
essence, a bet on the future volatility of the indices.
This potential volatility can be mitigated by use of
simultaneous currency swaps.
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EXHIBIT 4.3: 3 MONTH TREASURY VS 3 MONTH EURODOLLAR
February 1983 to May 1987
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Second, although no principal is at risk, the potential
exists for loss of interest payments through default. This
risk can be mitigated through letters of credit or
guarantees, but at additional cost. Collateral posting is
another alternative, but in the case of the mortgage
security, any collateral position would be subordinate to
the bondholders. Furthermore the amount of collateral
required, usually 10 to 15 percent of principal, would
reduce the amount of senior debt in a senior / subordinated
structure.5
The default risk is in part assumed by the swap dealer who
acts as the intermediary. The intermediaries, make
agreements with each counterparty to the transaction. One
counterparty, consequently, often does not know who the
other counterparty is. The intermediary will also act as
settlement agent during the life of the contract, and
provide guarantees against default. By acting as a
principal to the transaction, the swap dealers must accept
the credit exposure for the life of the agreement. Any
decline in the creditworthiness of either counterparty, and
the dealer's credit exposure is increased. Yet there is no
protection from this change; no counterparty is willing to
acknowledge the possibility of a downgrading of their
credit, let alone make provision for it.
In 1986, The Beacon Companies and Equitable Real Estate
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Investment Management financed the construction of a new
downtown office building at 75 State Street with a
commercial paper interest rate swap in lieu of a traditional
construction loan. In order to draw funds as needed, the
borrowers raised money by issuing AAA rated commercial paper
through a ten year letter of credit (LOC) with Citibank.
This paper had a floating coupon payment indexed to the
three month treasury bill rate.
In a simultaneous agreement the borrower entered into an
interest rate swap with a third party. They agreed to swap
a 10 year fixed rate payment at 9.5% in exchange for a
floating rate payment based on the Combined Federal Funds
rate paid by the counterparty. The floating rate payment,
10 basis points below the floating obligation of the
commercial paper, passed through the borrower to meet the
debt payments of the commercial paper issued. This
arrangement provided the borrower with an effective
borrowing rate of 9.6%.
The fundamental concern for the borrower in this transaction
is the creditworthiness of the LOC issuer. Any downgrading
of the creditworthiness of Citibank will raise the required
returns on its commercial paper. This additional cost of
funds is passed directly to the borrower, widening the 10
basis point spread between the floating rate payments.
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In another transaction, the financing of construction of
Rowes Wharf, a mixed use development on Boston Harbor, The
same borrowers immunized themselves from this credit risk.
A similar swap arrangement was made, but instead of issuing
commercial paper, the borrowers negotiated a floating rate
loan with the Bank of Boston. The floating rate of this
debt obligation was based on an index independent from the
creditworthiness of the bank.
Interest rate swaps are a recent development, having first
emerged in the late 1970's. Yet, by 1986, the International
Swap Dealer's Association estimated outstanding principal
contracts of it's 33 largest members to exceed $200 Billion.
The bulk of the activity has occured in the last two years
in the wake of declining interest rates. Most of these
deals have yet to weather a high interest rate environment,
raising questions about their relative strength. The
magnitude of the intermediaries' holdings also raises
6questions about their creditworthiness
The secondary market for these instruments is currently
limited to the capacity of about two dozen dealers.
Furthermore their is no retail market. Consequently
liquidity becomes an issue. And without liquidity, there is
less chance of laying off risk onto others.
Defaults by intermediaries seems unlikely. However, should
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the downgrading of the intermediary's credit worthiness
cause default by a counterparty due to unforseen
disintermediation, the acceptance of interest rate swaps
would likely diminish. To date, no defaults have occurred,
and over 90% of swaps involve debt rated Baa or better.
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CHAPTER V. RISK EVALUATION
As identified in Chapter III, regardless of the market in
which a mortgage backed security is sold, there is some
disclosure of the risk of the deal. Mortgage backed
securities can be sold with or without a rating, but in
either case, the risk must be evaluated in order to
determine a commensurate return. The rating agencies, such
as Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor Services and Duff &
Phelps, have simply institutionalized the risk assesment for
the benefit of both buyers and sellers of securities. These
agencies are disinterested parties to the transactions,
providing objective measures. The purpose of the agencies'
analysis is to qualify and categorize the risk of the
security with respect to its capacity to make timely
payments of interest and repayment of principal. The rating
is not a recommendation to buy or sell a security. Nor is
it a commentary on the price or the suitability for a
particular investor.
While the designations differ among the rating agencies, the
interpretations are similar. Standard & Poor's rating
system uses the following designations:
AAA The highest quality. Capacity to pay is extremely
strong.
AA Capacity to pay is very strong; differs only slightly
from AAA.
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A Capacity to pay is strong, but somewhat more
susceptible to changes in circumstance and economic
conditions than AA, AAA.
BBB Capacity is adequate
BB,B,CCC,CC Predominately speculative with respect to
capacity to pay. (These and lower rated
issues are characterized as "high yield" or
"junk" bonds).
C Reserved for income bonds on which no interest is being
paid.
D Debt is in default; payment is in arrears.
Studies have indicated that the ratings are good predictors
of default. Hickman found that, for the period 1900 to
1943, approximately 6% of bonds rated AAA or AA and 13.4% of
bonds rated A at the time of the offering subsequently
2defaulted . Furthermore, bond ratings have been found to be
3highly negatively correlated to yields
In 1984, Standard & Poor's (S&P) developed the first system
for rating property specific commercial mortgage backed
securities. In 1986, Moody's and Duff & Phelp's followed
with their own versions4 . As all three systems have the
same purpose, this paper examines the S&P system. By
examination of these rating systems, one can understand the
issues of risk relevant to mortgage securities, whether or
not they are rated. More significantly, one can also
identify the limitations placed on the borrower in order to
achieve a particular rating. These limitations can be
evaluated with respect to their effect on the cost of funds
to the borrower.
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Standard & Poor's Rating System
Standard & Poor's uses a two part rating process. First the
specifics of the property are carefully analyzed. Then the
proforma revenue stream is tested against a phased-in, worst
case scenario. The current analytical model has been
developed for use on prime quality, fully occupied
properties with demonstrated operating histories. However,
interviews with staff members indicate the scope of the
model may be expanded in the near future to include other
commercial uses.
In examining the property, S&P reviews an MAI appraisal,
engineering reports and historical operating data. This is
followed by a site visit. After establishing the quality of
the physical asset, the projected income stream is subjected
to the worst case scenario. The scenario, based on
Houston's economic changes after 1982, assumes the property
will experience sharp declines in rental income while
vacancy and operating expense increase. The model develops
a matrix of eight variables which are weighted with respect
to their effect on each analytical factor. Exhibit 5.1
illustrates these relationships.
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EXHIBIT 5.1: S&P WORST CASE MODEL FACTORS
Worst Case Analytical Factors (%)
-------------------------------------
RENT VACANCY EXPENSE
Project Size 5 5 0
Lease Terms 25 20 5
Tenant Quality
& Mix 5 5 5
Property
Management 25 30 30
Energy
Efficiency 5 5 30
Construction
Quality 5 5 30
Site Location 20 20 0
Local Economy 10 10 0
Total 100 100 100
National Worst Case: Maximum Reduction
---------------------------------
Rent Reduction 29.0%
Vacancy Increase 11.5%
Operating Expense Increase 15.0%
Source: Standard & Poor's Corp. 5
The Maximum reduction factors are multiplied by (100 -
Variable Sum) to determine the factor for the property. In
order to reflect the characteristics of the specific
property under evaluation, each of the eight variables can
be be reduced from 10% to 90%. These reductions can be
phased in over the first three years of the projections to
reflect a worsening recession, or can occur immediately if
region is already in complete decline.
After the worst case cash flow projections are calculated,
the current and worst case market value is calculated for
every year the bonds are outstanding. S&P uses the income
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approach, selecting severe discount rates and residual
capitalization rates, which are phased in over time. These
rates will vary depending on the desired bond rating,
starting with a 10% real rate of return for AA and dropping
50 bp for ratings AA through BBB, then 100bp for ratings BB
and B. Any growth rate is added to this real rate.
Finally the cash flows and property values are measured
against financial ratios . These ratios also vary depending
on the rating desired, and are listed in Exhibit 5.2.
EXHIBIT 5.2: WORST CASE FINANCIAL RATIOS
FOR OFFICE BUILDINGS
RATING DEBT SERVICE LOAN TO VALUE
COVERAGE RATIO (%)
AA 1.25 75%
A 1.15 75%
BBB 1.1 80%
BB 1.05 85%
B 1 90%
Source: Standard & Poor's Corp. 6
In addition to these financial ratio tests, S&P reguires the
project maintain a liquidity reserve account equal to the
greater of two months of gross revenue or three months
rental payments from the highest paying tenant. In no case
must the liquidity reserve be greater than one third of the
annual debt service on the bonds. This reserve is required
to insure against late mortgage payments.
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Any shortfall of cash flow to meet bond interest payments or
shortfall of residual value to cover principal repayment for
any of the years that the bond is outstanding must be
insured against by means of credit support. In addition to
shortfalls, the credit support mustalso cover the liquidity
reserve. All credit support must be in place at the bond
closing.
S&P recognizes that real estate is not a liquid asset. So
to insure that funds are available for bond redemption at
maturity, they require the posting of a liquid asset credit
facility, equal to the redemption value of the bonds,in the
form of a letter of credit, surety bond, cash or U.S.
government securities. This must be posted two years prior
to bond maturity, unless the property meets a loan to
value(LTV) ratio of 67.5% at that time. Passing this test,
the posting can be deferred until one year prior to
maturity. Posting can be delayed until six months prior if
7-
the property still meets the LTV test one year prior .
Meeting the requirements of this rating test will assist the
borrower in obtaining the best possible rate on the bond.
However, the rating process offsets some of the pricing
efficiency gained through the restrictions and reserve
requirements it imposes. The costs of these restrictions
are discussed in Chapter VI. While the rating system must,
by definition, be conservative, over time it is expected
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that the criteria may become less restrictive due to the
increased availability of historical performance data on
rated properties and increased familiarity with real estate
market fundamentals. A topic for further study is the
impact of the rating systems on both the method of real
estate appraisal and the underwriting guidelines of
conventional lenders.
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CHAPTER VI. COSTS OF CAPITAL
Cost of securitized offerings
Direct and Indirect costs, deferred costs and opportunity
costs must be identified and aggregated in order to
determine the effective cost of capital to the borrower of
funds raised through a securitized offering. The basic cost
structure of any securitized offering, public or private,
consists of the following components:
Base Rate - This rate is set by the cost of treasury
securities of the same maturity as the proposed bonds plus a
premium. This measure reflects the cost of funds to the
issuer.
Spread Over Base Rate - This rate is a percentage over the
treasury rate. The combined base rate and spread represent
the coupon rate for the bond offering. It also represents
the lending rate for the mortgage placed with the borrower.
The exact percentage is determined through market testing by
the issuer of investors' willingness to pay for the type of
offering proposed.
Placement Fee - This is the fee charged by the issuer for
placing the offering in the capital markets. Also referred
to as the structuring fee or underwriters fee, it is
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typically equal to a percentage of the bond principal. Fees
for underwriting corporate bonds have been found to average
1%, for bond issues in excess of $50 Million. Professionals
interviewed for this paper indicate this is also the range
for commercial mortgage bonds, although the variance is plus
or minus 30 basis points.
Credit Enhancement Fee - The fee is charged by an agency in
return for the pledge of credit to support the timely
payment of principle and interest to the bondholders.
Credit Enhancement may be required on a rated security to
support any possible shortfalls or disruption to the project
cashflow. The amount of credit enhancement required to
achieve a given rating is determined by the rating agencies
through their evaluation process.
Credit enhancement may provide an unconditional and
irrevocable guarantee or may be limited to a specific
amount. In either case the fee charged will reflect the
magnitude and vulnerability of the liability. Credit
Enhancement fees are paid both at the initiation of the
transaction structuring, as a form of commitment fee, and
quarterly for each year until redemption.
Credit enhancement may take several forms:
* Cash or other liquid asset reserves placed in trust.
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* Letter of Credit (LC) issued by domestic or foreign banks.
* Surety Bonds issued by Insurance companies.
As described in earlier chapters, there are ways to achieve
credit enhancement without incurring direct costs, such as:
* Over - collateralization; the reduction of the loan to
value (LTV) ratio by increasing collateral assets.
* Senior / Subordinated Structuring; the reduction of the
LTV ratio by reduction of the loan amount.
The cost of credit enhancement have fallen sharply in recent
months. This is primarily due to the major Japanese Banks,
which seem determined to obtain a foothold in the credit
enhancement market through aggressive pricing. They have
chosen this strategy to overcome the disadvantage of being
an unknown entity to most domestic borrowers, who may show a
preference for dealing with familiar organizations, all else
being equal. Currently in their favor is that six of the
worlds'ten largest and highest rated banks are Japanese.1
Citibank is the only U.S. bank to maintain the highest
rating designation. Those offerings desiring to issue debt
with a AAA rating must purchase the credit worthiness of
some AAA rated organization.
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YIELD SPREADS BETWEEN AAA AND AA RATED
CORPORATE BONDS, FEBRUARY 1985 TO MARCH 1987
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EXHIBIT 6.1:
Recent credit enhancement annual costs have ranged between
30bp to 40bp of the amount of principal and interest
payments protected. As shown in Exhibit 6.1, the yield
spread between AAA and AA corporate debt varies greatly but
during the period February 1985 to March 1987 spreads ranged
from 34bp to 59bp. Although this is not an accurate
representation of the spreads between similarly rated
commercial mortgage backed securities, the relationships are
similar. To the extent that credit enhancement fees are
less than or equal to these spreads, their cost benefits the
borrower.
Legal and Accounting Fees - These are fees charged for the
drafting and coordination of all documents including the
mortgage and offering statements, as well as review and
modification of these documents to conform to the rating
agencies' requirements. In the case of a private placement,
legal fees may also be incurred for negotiations with
investors as to the specific details of credit enhancement,
prepayment rights, reseve accounts and other items of
importance to the investors security. The accounting fees
are also for the procurement of certified statements
regarding the offering documents. These costs vary
principally with the complexity, rather than the size, of an
offering. Estimates range from $700,000 to $1,300,000.
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Printing and
printing of
notification
to $100,000.
Advertizing Costs
the prospectus
of the offering.
- These represent costs of
and other requirements of
Estimates range from $75,000
Rating
These
bonds,
Fees - for rating services as described in Chapter 5.
fees are approximately .04% of the amount of the
plus a nominal amount annually to update the rating.
Trustee fees - Collection accounts must be maintained for
the receipt of mortgage payments and distribution of
interest payments and principal repayments to the bond or
certificate holders. These fees are typically calculated on
the basis of activity in the accounts. In any event they
are an insignifcant fraction of the costs.
Title Insurance - As with any real estate transaction, the
mortgagee must be protected from claims against or defects
in the title. The cost of title insurance are estimated at
$150,000 to $250,000 for larger transactions.
Appraisal fee - Typically about $40,000 to $60,000 plus an
annual update fee.
Liquid Asset Credit Facility - As described
rated offerings require the posting of this
this is a future cost, it is dependent on
in Chapter 5,
facility. As
unforeseeable
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market conditions, and therefore cannot be accurately
priced. However, if a rated bond has call privileges prior
to maturity, it is conceivable the posting requirement would
trigger early redemption to avoid the additional cost. The
potential for this occurrence is dependent on whether the
bonds have yield maintainance provisions and the interest
rate environment for reinvestment at that point in time.
Base Rate and Spread
The choice of a base rate is dependent on the cost of
capital for the issuer of the bonds and underlying mortgage,
as well as the proposed structure of the bond offering. The
mortgage supports the timely payment of interest and
principle to the bondholders. It is therefore desirable to
match the principle payments of the mortgage with the
maturities of the bonds. For example, a 10 year, interest
only, balloon mortgage is matched with 10 year treasury
bonds. Or a mortgage with principle payments due in years
1, 3, 5 and 10 is matched with a group of treasury
instruments of the same maturity and par value.
By surveying potential investors, the issuers determine the
expected yield demanded for the proposed bond offering. The
yield required is influenced by several factors:
Liquidity - Rated Commercial Mortgage Bonds are not actively
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traded, principally due to the recent introduction of the
instruments. In a few instances the issuer makes a market
in the security, offering to buy and sell for its own
account in order to create some liguidity. The investor
demands a higher return on investments of less liquidity.
Prepayment Risk - As an instrument supported by a physical
asset, the bonds are at risk of prepayment of the underlying
mortgages due to some catastrophic loss or act of
government, such as condemnation. Although these acts may
be covered by insurance for the repayment of principle, the
investors yield to maturity will drop. Due to the structure
of the mortgage instruments and the tendency to include
yield maintainance provisions in the event of prepayment at
the borrowers choice, property specific financings are less
affected by this risk.
Reinvestment Risk - Accompanying prepayment risk is the risk
of finding suitable investments offering the desired returns
to maintain the yield that would have been achieved had the
bond not been prepaid.
Historic Rate Spreads - Traditionally, mortgage lending
rates have been higher than corporate lending rates,
indicative of a perception of higher risk in real estate
related investments. Despite the advent of ratings and
liquid trading instruments, investors still carry higher
66
expectations about the risk and returns for mortgage backed
investments.
Comparison to Bullet Loans
Evaluating the effective cost of capital to the borrower
requires a comparative analysis with respect to the cost of
funds available through conventional lenders such as banks,
insurance companies and pension funds. As stated earlier,
these sources are usually limited to loan amounts between $5
million and $200 million 2, while securitized offerings are
limited to a minimum of $25 million. Borrowers who fall
within the overlap may choose whether the restrictions
inherent in the securitized offering are warranted by an
advantageous effective cost of capital.
Exhibit 6.2 illustrates the average interest rates for ten
year,interest only bullet loans offered by thirty major U.S.
lenders, the yields of ten year Treasury bonds, and the
yield spreads between the two for the period February 1983
to March 1987. Since ten year mortgage bond interest rates
are typically indexed to the ten year treasury, the yield
spread represents the margin within which the additional
costs of the securitzed transaction must remain in order to
have an interest rate advantage over bullet loans.
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6.2: YIELDS ON TEN YEAR BULLET LOANS
VERSUS TEN YEAR TREASURY BONDS
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It should be noted ,however, that there are costs to a
bullet loan in addition to the lending rate, such as
commitment fees, appraisals and engineering reports, which
raise the effective borrowing rate. Subsequently the spread
above ten year treasuries is higher than indicated in
Exhibit 6.2, providing a wider margin within which
securitized offerings can compete. Estimating these
additional costs and comparing them to borrowing rates
through security offerings is beyond the scope of this
paper, and is a topic for further research. One can expect
that increased competition from securitzed offerings for
loan originations will tend to narrow the spreads of
conventional lenders. Evidence of this occurence can be
found in the recent narrowing of spreads between bullet
loans and ten year treasuries.3
opportunity Costs
Time and timing are the most significant determinants of the
magnitude of the opportunity costs of securitized offerings.
The time required to complete a securitzed transaction from
inception is estimated to range from seven to nine months.
By comparison, a bullet loan transaction typically takes 60
to 90 days to complete, and can be as little as two weeks.
This extensive lead time for security offerings exposes the
borrower to interest rate risk. As the market for these
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securities matures, and the products become more
standardized, the lead time may shorten. However, the
nature of the sales and disclosure requirements, and the
time required to complete the rating analysis, typically
thirty to ninety days, limit the potential for improvement
in lead time needed to execute such transactions.
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CHAPTER VII. CASE STUDIES
Lincoln Property Associates
In December 1985, Lincoln Properties Associates Limited, a
subsidiary of Lincoln Property of Dallas, Texas, issued $146
Million in fully registered, first mortgage bonds to finance
the take out commitment of two office buildings then under
construction. The issuer was organized primarily to issue
the bonds and to serve as managing general partner for two
project partnerships that would construct and own the
buildings. The bonds were placed privately without third
party credit enhancement.
Lincoln Liberty, a Pennsylvania limited partnership, was the
project partnership for Allegheny Tower, located in
Pittsburgh, Pa., which will be 32 stories and will contain
615,360 leasable square feet. At the time of the offering,
Allegheny Corporation had commited to approximately 42% of
the space under a ten year lease from completion plus an
agreement to masterlease another 11%. Rents range from
$26.50 to $31.50 per square foot. The anticipated
completion date is August 1987.
The appraised market value at completion was $137.5 Million.
Construction cost was estimated at $97.44 Million, or 70.9%
of the appraised value. Allegheny Tower received $114.6
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Million (78.5%) of the bond proceeds.
Midland North, a Georgia limited partnership, was the
project partnership for the FHLB Building in Atlanta
Georgia. The building is 11 stories and contains 240,907
leasable square feet. The tenant, The Federal Home Loan
Bank, has leased 62% of the space for ten years from
completion, originally estimated as July 1986. Actual
completion was on schedule. Midland North has a fee simple
interest in the property. The appraised market value at
completion was $45 Million. Construction cost was estimated
at $28.5 Million, or 63.3% of the appraised value. The FHLB
Building received $31.4 Million, or 21.5% of the bond
proceeds.
The bonds are secured by mortgages on the two properties.
Lincoln Liberty mortgaged its leasehold estate under a
groundlease from Penn-Liberty Holding Company. The mortgage
is subordinate to the rights of the groundlessee, including
the right to receive rent payments. The mortgage is also
subordinate to an $8.5 Million UDAG loan originated in 1984
and maturing in 2066. The mortgage on the FHLB Building is
a deed to secure debt evidencing a first lien on Midland
North's fee simple interest. The bonds also received
collateral assignments of the leases and rents after
construction, and have first security interest in the bond
proceeds until construction completion. Limitations were
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placed on project sale or refinancing, leins and lease
terms.
Lincoln Property Associates Limited guaranteed construction
costs, including cost overruns without right to
reimbursement, and guaranteed funds for bond redemption, in
proportion to each project's proceeds, if either project was
not completed within one year. The issuer also guaranteed
to make loans to the partnerships prior to and for two years
after the break even points. The managing general partners
defered their development fees.
The bonds mature in 2000 and make interest payments
seni-annually. They have a fixed coupon rate of 10.5%, an
additional variable rate increment of 50% of net cash flow
of the partnerships, and 50% of the residual value of each
project at maturity. Maximum allowable interest was capped
at 22.5% compounded semi-annually. The bond issue,
underwritten by Drexel Burnham Lambert, had a three percent
underwriting discount and incurred approximately $651,000 in
transactions costs, equal to an additional 45 basis points
The FHLB Building was sold in January, 1987, approximately
six months after completion of the building shell. The
capitalization rate at time of sale was approximately 8.5%.
Early sale of the project was encouraged by the underwriter
in order to maximize the bondholders return, while
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shortening the bond duration. The yield to the bondholders
was estimated to exceed 30%. This was due in large part to
the early redemption and the 50% participation in the
residuals. However, since the payment to the bondholders
was capped at 22.5% compounded, The additional return from
net sale proceeds was held in abeyance until the maturity of
the balance of the bonds.
The bonds' participation features created a debt structure
tantamount to a participating mortgage. The developer,
Lincoln Properties, believed that equivalent, or possibly
better terms were available through conventional lenders.
Their stated reasons for electing the securitized structure
were fourfold. First the capital reguirements of the
project would probably exceed the lending limits of most
individual lenders. Second, by using the capital markets,
the developer hoped to expand the ownership pool beyond that
of a limited partnership structure. This expansion afforded
the opportunity for Lincoln Properties to develop new
business relationships and strengthen its reputation as a
national development company. Third, by financing two
buildings simultaneously; the developer hoped to realize
time savings as well as realize scale economies. Fourth,
the transaction afforded the opportunity to learn how to
access the capital markets. The company believes the best
way to accomplish this is through direct experience.
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The developer identified certain drawbacks to the
transaction. Notably, the issue raised all the funds before
they were needed to take out the construction loans. An
agreement was negotiated for the underwriter to reinvest the
proceeds until needed. The underwriter had to guarantee a
reinvestment rate of 10.5%, identical to the bonds fixed
coupon, plus the security of the full amount of principal.
They also had to guarantee the principal be available when
needed. This agreement shifted the reinvestment risk to the
underwriter. Without this agreement, the developer would
have to consider this risk as part of his cost of
capital.
A second feature of the issue was time. It took
approximately nine months to organize and complete the
complicated transaction. This compares to the typical 60 to
90 days which transpire before receiving funding through
conventional lenders. The opportunity cost of this time
must also be considered in the cost of capital to the
developer. However, Lincoln Properties intends to
simultaneously finance multiple projects in the future.
They expect additional projects will not incrementally
increase the time for issuance and economies of scale will
be realized.
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Bank of Boston
In December, 1986, Equitable Federal Street Funding Company,
a bancruptcy-proof Massachusetts general partnership formed
by The Equitable Life Assurance Society, issued $270 Million
in non-recourse, ten year notes secured by a first mortgage
on the Bank of Boston Building at 100 Federal Street in
Boston, which was purchased by Equitable in 1985 for $363
million. The bonds were issued to refinance 100 Federal
Street by Equitable Federal Street Realty Company Limited
Partnership.The issue was provided with $30,680,000 credit
support collateral in the form of a irrevocable,
unconditional letter of credit issued by Algemene Bank
Nederland N.V. No other guarantees were provided.
Completed in 1971, the property is 37 stories above grade,
three stories below grade and contains 1,355,610 rentable
square feet (1,474,150 gross square feet). It's site,
82,900 S.F. comprises an entire block of the city's
financial district. The building is one of only 12
buildings in this district that is over 25 stories tall.
The major tenant is Bank of Boston Corporation's principal
subsidiary, The First National Bank of Boston, which leases
77% of the building. Bank of Boston is the largest
commercial bank headquartered in New England and its long
term debt is rated AA by Standard & Poor's.
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On August 1, 1986, the vacancy rate stood at 2.5%; in 1985
the average rate was 3.1%. The vacancy rate for seasoned
comparable properties in the downtown area was 2.9%, while
for all buildings, seasoned properties as well as completed
properties in lease-up, the vacancy rate was 9.1%. Total
prime rentable office space by 1987 was projected at
approximately 22 million square feet of which approximately
19 million was on line at the offering date. Approximately
14 million was contained in 23 buildings.
Office rents ranged from $33 to $41, plus pass through
expenses. Estimated net cash flow before debt service was:
1987 1988 1996
692$----------------------------------------
6% Inflation $29,191,000 $32,364,000 $51,252,000
3% Inflation $29,174,000 $32,086,000 $38,515,000
The appraised market value of the building and land was $405
million. The loan to value ratio was therefore 66.67%.
Dividing the estimated 1986 unlevered net cash flow of
$29,716,000 by the appraised value yields a capitalization
rate of 7.34%.
The bonds were issued at par in two series, current pay
coupons and zero ,or accrued interest coupons. $245 million
of current pay notes were redeemable at par, with a 9.271%
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semi-annual coupon. Annual debt service for these notes was
$22,713,950. The zero notes were sold at two accrual rates:
$15 million at 9.428%, yielding $37,456,000 at maturity; and
$10 million at 9.589%, yielding &25,358,000 at maturity.
The effective borrowing rate, or cost of capital, is the
blended rate of the three coupons, or 9.29%.
The bonds are call protected for years one through five. In
years six through ten the bonds may be redeemed in whole,
but not in part, for the full amount of principal plus
accrued interest to the redemption date,and a bond premium
calculated at redemption to equal the original yield to
maturity.
The unlevered return to the owner was equal to the 1986 net
cash flow of $29,717,000 divided by the purchase price of
$363,000,000, yielding 8.19%. After the offering, the
return equaled the 1986 net cash flow after debt service of
$6,460,000 divided by the remaining $93 million in equity,
yielding 6.95%. The reduced yield is the result of
the negative leverage created by borrowing money at a rate
higher than the unlevered return. The negative leverage is
furthe increased by the high interest rates on the accrual
bonds. The effect of the the lower return must be
compensated for either by the reinvestment rate of the $270
million in proceeds, which must earn in excess of the bond
rate, or by the residual value.
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The accrual notes are essentially a bet on the residual
value of the property. However, their risk is relatively
small. The total redemption value of the notes is
$307,814,000. Combined with the value of the owners'
initial equity after the offering of $93 million the total
equal $400,814,000. In order to redeem the bonds and return
the owners initial equity in 1996, the property must
appreciate at approximately one percent annually.
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CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION
Real estate investors must address several issues before
choosing property specific commercial mortgage securities as
a funding vehicle. In particular, they must consider the
size of the deal, the costs of the offering, and the
restrictions placed on the borrower. In return for these
limitations, the borrower is able to access much larger sums
of capital than through conventional sources, typically at
competitive interest rates.
Securitized transactions are large scale transactions, which
use the global capital markets as their source of funds.
They typically raise in excess of $25 million, and are
capable of raising over $1 billion in single offerings.
This capacity far exceeds that of conventional lenders,
which usually loan from $5 million to $200 million.
Scale economies play a significant role in the cost of funds
of securitized transactions. Although the underwriting and
structuring fees paid to the security issuer are usually a
percentage of the amount raised, many additional costs, such
as legal counsel, financial printing, advertising,
appraisals and administrative expense, are relatively
constant. As the size of an offering diminishes, these
fixed costs translate to an increasing percentage load on
the cost of funds to the borrower. There is a threshold at
82
which these costs eliminate the ability for securitized
issues to compete with the cost of funds available through
conventional sources.
In addition to direct costs, securitized offerings can
impose indirect costs on the borrower. Posting of liquid
asset reserve facilities, credit support, and the
reinvestment risk of property cash flows until payment of
semi-annual bond payments should be evaluated. Loan to
value ratios may be lower than those allowed by conventional
lenders, thereby forcing the borrower to invest additional
equity.
Borrowers seeking to raise between $25 million and $200
million must compare the effective cost of capital to the
cost of capital available through conventional lenders.
This comparison must include all costs, including direct and
indirect costs, deferred costs and opportunity costs.
Limitations and Further Study
To date less than 30 PSCMS transactions are estimated to
have occured. Most of these securities have been sold in
the euromarket or through private placements, without the
requirement of public disclosure. Therefore access to
specific information regarding the costs of transactions is
limited. Of twelve organizations directly involved in
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securitized transactions which were contacted for this
paper, only two were willing to disclose details of their
offering. Furthermore, euromarkets and private placement
issues have limited trading activity after the initial
offering, thereby limiting the examination of the
characteristics of these instruments performance. Those who
choose to enter into these transactions will find the best
source of information to be the investment banking houses
which underwrite the deals.
With time, the ability to amass comprehensive data regarding
property specific commercial mortgage securities may
improve. One topic for further research in this area would
involve the determination of effective cost of capital to
the borrower by making a detailed comparison of actual
issuing costs of these securities with respect to their
rating classification and their yield when first issued.
This cost of capital could then be compared to the cost of
capital through conventional lenders to determine if
increased frequency of issuance of these securities fosters
pricing efficiency.
Another topic for study is the impact of the rating systems
on both the method of real estate appraisal and the
underwriting guidelines of conventional lenders.
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